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ABSTRACT
The inherent intermittency of renewable sources like wind and
solar has resulted in a bundling of renewable generators with stor-
age resources (batteries) for increased reliability. In this paper, we
consider the problem of energy sharing between two such bundles,
each associated with their own demand profiles. The demand pro-
files might, for example, correspond to commitments made by the
bundle to the grid. With each bundle seeking to minimize its loss
of load rate, we explore the possibility that one bundle can supply
energy to the other from its battery at times of deficit, in return for
a reciprocal supply from the other when it faces a deficit itself. We
show that there always exist mutually beneficial energy sharing
arrangements between the two bundles. Moreover, we show that
Pareto-optimal arrangements involve at least one bundle transfer-
ring energy to the other at the maximum feasible rate at times of
deficit. We illustrate the potential gains from such dynamic energy
sharing via an extensive case study.
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KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Environmental concerns are driving a worldwide push towards the
adoption of renewable sources for electricity generation. However,
the primary challenge in increasing the penetration of renewable
sources in the electricity grid is the intermittency and unpredictabil-
ity of their generation. As a result, renewable sources are increas-
ingly being bundled with storage devices (batteries) to smoothe out
the temporal intermittency in generation, enabling the generator
to supply power to the grid according to a contracted supply pro-
file with high reliability. In this paper, we explore dynamic energy
sharing between two such bundles (also referred to as agents), each
consisting of a renewable generator and a battery, with the goal of
enhancing the reliability of both bundles.
The idea behind dynamic energy sharing is that one can exploit
statistical diversity between the net generation (supply minus de-
mand) processes of the bundles, so that one agent can supply energy
to the other (from its battery) in times of deficit. For example, a solar
generator and a wind generator could opportunistically supply en-
ergy to one another, in order to meet their respective commitments
to the grid. However, such a sharing arrangement would only work
if it benefits both parties involved, i.e., the sharing arrangement
must be mutually beneficial. Interestingly, naive complete pooling,
wherein the two batteries are treated as one common resource,
may not have this property. This motivates us to consider partial
sharing mechanisms, wherein each agent supplies energy to the
other to meet its deficit, but only up to a pre-specified drain rate
(i.e., an upper bound on the rate of energy supply). One of our main
contribution is to show that there always exist mutually beneficial
partial sharing mechanisms of this kind.
Having established the existence of mutually beneficial sharing
configurations, the next natural step is to capture the Pareto fron-
tier of efficient sharing configurations. Remarkably, we are able to
provide a precise characterization of this Pareto frontier; all Pareto-
optimal configurations involve at least one agent allowing the other
to draw energy at the maximum possible rate in times of deficit.
Given this characterization of the Pareto frontier, one can capture
the sharing arrangements that would emerge between the agents
by appealing to the theory of bargaining [20].
Structurally, our work is related to the vast literature on re-
source pooling in service systems and networks. This body of
work explores the sharing of a resource, such as service capac-
ity, bandwidth, cache memory, etc., to exploit statistical economies
of scale [2, 5, 8, 12, 13, 22, 23]. However, the primary style of pool-
ing considered in this literature is complete pooling, wherein the
entities ‘merge’ by pooling their resources completely, with the
payoff of the coalition being split among its members using ideas
from cooperative game theory. In contrast, our interest here is in
the setting of non-transferable utility, wherein no side payments
occur between the agents, implying that an agent would agree to
a sharing arrangement only if doing so increases its own (private,
non-transferable) utility. The only other work we are aware of
that takes this approach is [21], which focuses on partial server
sharing between two Erlang-B loss systems. However, the system
modeling, sharing mechanism, and its analysis differ considerably
between [21] and the present paper.
At its core, our model involves inventory pooling between two
agents, each having its own supply and demand process. These
agents might correspond to renewable generators connected to the
grid with their own contracted supply commitments, prosumers
within a smart microgrid (as in [24]), or even different remote micro-
grids that can help each another increase their reliability1. Our main
departure from the prior literature on these topics (described below)
is the cooperative game theoretic framework of non-transferable
utility. This is applicable in situations where agents cannot balance
a certain loss of reliability with a monetary reward. Instead, we
appeal to the theory of bargaining to balance the benefit of both
1https://www.cleantech.com/power-to-the-people-remote-microgrids-across-southeast-asia/
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agents from the sharing arrangement. For example, in the case of
renewable generators participating in electricity markets, maintain-
ing high reliability might be a pre-requisite for market participation.
Similarly, remote microgrids might prefer not to set up a system of
monetary payments, but to simply maintain equity in the benefits
from energy sharing.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. After a
quick review of the related literature below, we describe our system
model and our energy sharing mechanism in Section 2. We establish
key monotonicity properties of our sharing model in Section 3.
Pareto-optimal sharing configurations are addressed in Section 4.
We present a case study in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
Related literature
There are two broadly two strands of work on dynamic energy
sharing between renewable generators (or prosumers). The first
treats energy trading as an economic transaction, using prices to
design market mechanisms for efficient energy transfer; papers that
take this approach include [6, 7, 10, 11, 16–18].
The second strand of work treats energy sharing from the stand-
point of a central optimizer, who is interested in maximizing social
welfare. For example, [15] analyzes the tradeoff between sharing
and the use of storage within smart microgrid. Another work in this
space is [24], which focuses on scheduling algorithms for energy
transfer within a microgrid for loss minimization.
In contrast to the first stream of work, the present paper consid-
ers the non-transferable utility setting, i.e., one where there are no
side-payments between the agents. In contrast to the second strand,
we still consider the agents as strategic, in that they participate in
energy sharing mechanisms with the sole objective to enhancing
their own reliability.
2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We begin by describing the ‘standalone’ setting, i.e., in the absence
of a sharing arrangement between the agents. We use the following
notation throughout the paper: For x ∈ R,
[x]+ = (x)+ = max(0,x),
[x]− = (x)− = −min(0,x).
Also, when referring to any Agent i, we refer to the other agent as
Agent −i .
2.1 Standalone setting
We consider two agents, Agent 1 and Agent 2, each associated with a
stochastic supply and demand process, and equipped with a battery.
The battery of Agent i has capacity Bi . The energy content in the
battery is modulated by each agent’s net generation (i.e., supply
minus demand) process. Specifically, we denote the net (power)
generation process of Agent i by ri (t) = дi (t) − di (t), where дi (t)
and di (t) denote, respectively, the supply and demand process of
Agent i . For example, дi (t) might represent the power generation
from a renewable generator, and di (t) its contracted commitment to
the grid. Thus, the energy content in the battery of Agent i, denoted
by bi (t), evolves as follows:
d
dt
bi (t) =

0 if bi (t) = 0 and ri (t) < 0,
0 if bi (t) = Bi and ri (t) > 0,
ri (t) otherwise.
(1)
The above dynamics capture the boundary conditions that a fully
charged battery cannot be charged further, and an empty battery
cannot be discharged further.2 Except for these boundary cases,
the battery is charged/discharged at the net generation rate ri (t).
Further, we assume that the net generation rates r1(t) and r2(t) are
dependent on the state of a common background Markov process,
which captures the supply and demand uncertainty of each agent.
Formally, let {X (t)} denote the background Markov process. We
assume that that {X (t)} is an irreducible continuous-time Markov
chain (CTMC) over a finite state space S . The net generation rate
of Agent i is a function of the state of this background process, i.e.,
ri (t) = ri (X (t)).
To ensure regeneration of the buffer occupancy processes, we
assume there exist in S, states s1, s2, s3, and s4 satisfying:
• r1(s1), r2(s1) > 0,
• r1(s2), r2(s2) < 0,
• r1(s3) > 0, r2(s3) < 0, and r2(s3) ≤ r2(s) ∀s ∈ S,
• r1(s4) < 0, r2(s4) > 0, and r1(s4) ≤ r1(s) ∀s ∈ S .
State s1 (respectively, s2) results in positive (respectively, negative)
net generation for both agents. State s3 results in a positive net
generation for Agent 1 and a negative net generation for Agent 2,
such that this is also the most negative net generation for Agent 2.
State s4 is similar, except the roles of the agents are reversed.
We note here that this model is quite general; the state of the
background process could capture all factors that influence the sup-
ply and demand of each agent, including past and present weather
conditions, as well as time of day. Moreover, the model allows for
the net generation processes of both agents to be correlated in
an arbitrary fashion. Finally, ramp constraints on battery charg-
ing/discharging can also be incorporated into the model; these
would simply limit the values that the (battery modulating) net
generation process can take.
The performance of each agent is measured via its loss of load
rate (LLR), which is the long run average rate of lost load (unmet
demand). Based on the battery dynamics (1), note that Agent i is
unable to cater to its demand when bi (t) = 0 and ri (t) < 0, i.e., the
battery is empty and the instantaneous generation is insufficient to
meet the instantaneous demand. Thus, the standalone loss of load
rate of Agent i is defined as
LLRsai = limt→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
1{bi (t )=0}[ri (t)]−dt (almost surely). (2)
Here, 1{A} equals 1 if A is true and zero otherwise. Each agent
seeks to minimize its loss of load rate. Indeed, it would be natural
for the grid to penalize a renewable generator in terms of the LLR
relative to its contracted supply curve [3, 4]. Note that the existence
of the almost sure limit in (2) follows from the positive recurrence
of the background Markov process.
2In practice, for certain battery chemistries, it is not advisable to drain/charge the
battery completely. So ‘empty’ and ‘full’ in our model could in practice correspond to
the floor and ceiling of charge level the agent chooses to operate the battery with.
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For any agent, the evolution of its battery level can be modeled
as a Markov modulated fluid queue, a well studied object in the
queueing literature [1, 19]. In particular, it is easy to see that cor-
responding to Agent i, (X (t),bi (t)) is a Markov process over state
space S × [0,Bi ], whose invariant distribution can be computed
by solving a system of ordinary differential equations (see [1, 19]).
This invariant distribution can in turn be used to compute LLRi [9].
However, in the present paper, we are interested not in the ‘stan-
dalone’ behavior of each individual agent, but in dynamic energy
sharing arrangements between the two. (This naturally couples
the evolution of the two batteries, necessitating a joint analysis of
both battery occupancies.) Our proposed mechanism for dynamic
energy sharing is described next.
2.2 Sharing Mechanisms
For either agent, loss of load is undesirable (and might even result
in penalty from the grid [3, 4]). The motivation for dynamic energy
sharing is that when Agent i faces loss of load, Agent −i can supply
energy to Agent i from its battery to (either completely or partially)
satisfy the unmet demand. However, if no constraints are placed
on such energy transfer, i.e., if each agent can draw energy from
the other’s battery without restriction, the resulting configuration
might not be beneficial to both parties. Indeed, if Agent i is con-
siderably more likely to run a deficit than Agent −i, it is natural to
expect that unconstrained energy sharing would actually be detri-
mental to Agent −i .3 This motivates us to explore constrained or
partial energy sharing arrangements.
Our energy sharing arrangement is characterized by the tuple
(c1, c2). Informally, ci is the maximum energy drain rate allowed by
Agent i when Agent −i faces loss of load. Additionally, we assume
that there is a capacity constraint c on the rate of energy transfer
from either agent to the other. This captures any physical transmis-
sion constraints that limit the rate of energy transfer between the
agents.4 Thus, c1, c2 ≤ c .
Formally, if Agent −i runs a deficit at time t , i.e., b−i (t) = 0 and
r−i (t) < 0, then:
(1) If bi (t) ∈ (0,Bi ), then Agent i transfers energy to Agent −i
at rate
etri (t) = min(ci ,−r−i (t)).
Here, etr stands for energy transfer rate. In other words,
Agent i helps cut the deficit rate of Agent −i subject to a
maximum transfer rate of ci .
(2) If bi (t) = 0 and ri (t) > 0, then Agent i transfers energy to
Agent −i at rate
etri (t) = min(ri (t), ci ,−r−i (t)).
In this case, since Agent i cannot draw energy from its bat-
tery, its ability to transfer energy to Agent −i is further
limited by its own net generation rate ri (t). If bi (t) = 0 and
3That unconstrained energy sharing is not guaranteed to be mutually beneficial will
be demonstrated later.
4For simplicity, we take the capacity constraint to be symmetric; our results extend
naturally to the case where there are different upper bounds on the energy transfer
rate in the two directions. Moreover, in the absence of such constraints, c may be
set to be a suitably large value (say maxx∈S {max( |r1(x ) |, |r2(x ) |)}) such that this
constraint is never binding.
ri (t) ≤ 0, then Agent i itself faces loss of load, and therefore
cannot transfer energy to Agent −i, i.e., etri (t) = 0.
(3) if bi (t) = Bi , then Agent i transfers energy to Agent −i at
rate
• etri (t) = min(ci ,−r−i (t)) if ri ≤ min(ci ,−r−i (t)), and
• etri (t) = min(c, ri ) if ri > min(ci ,−r−i (t)).
In the former case, the nominal transfer rate ofmin(ci ,−r−i (t))
exceeds the net generation rate of Agent i, and so Agent i
begins to discharge its battery to help Agent −i . In the latter
case, the net generation rate of Agent i exceeds the nominal
transfer rate, and so Agent i does not discharge its battery,
but simply transfers its surplus generation to Agent −i sub-
ject to the capacity constraint c .
Additionally, when Agent i has a fully charged battery with a posi-
tive net generation rate, we assume that it transfers its overflow rate
to Agent −i (whether or not Agent −i faces loss of load), again sub-
ject to the capacity constraint c . Of course, if both batteries are fully
charged, then the overflow is lost. The above sharing mechanism is
summarized in Table 1.
It is important to note that under the proposed mechanism, un-
less Agent i’s battery is full, it only transfers energy to Agent −i
when the latter faces loss of load. Moreover, the energy transfer in
this case only covers (part of) the deficit rate, it does not actually
charge the battery of Agent −i .
Next, we define the loss of load rate for each agent under the
proposed sharing mechanism.
2.3 LLR characterization
Under the sharing configuration (c1, c2), the loss of load rate of
each agent is characterized as follows. When Agent i faces loss of
load, i.e., bi (t) = 0 and ri (t) < 0, then the instantaneous rate at
which it loses load equals [−ri (t) − etr−i (t)]+. Thus, its loss of load
rate is given by
LLRi (c1, c2) = limt→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
1{bi (t )=0, ri (t )<0}[−ri (t) − etr−i (t)]+ dt .
As before, the above limit is in an almost sure sense, and its existence
is guaranteed by the positive recurrence of the background process.
It is important to note that the sharing configuration (0, 0) is
not equivalent to the standalone setting, since even under the
(0, 0) configuration, the agents supply (overflow) energy to one
another when their batteries are full. In fact, it can be shown that
LLRi (0, 0) < LLRsai for i = 1, 2.
Given the complicated form of the sharing mechanism, one
would not expect a closed form characterization for LLRi (c1, c2);
indeed a closed form for the loss of load rate does not exist even
for the ‘standalone’ setting. However, we are still remarkably able
to analytically establish the following results.
• There existmutually beneficial sharing configurations. Specif-
ically, there exists a configuration (c1, c2) ∈ [0, c]2 such that
LLRi (c1, c2) < LLRi (0, 0) < LLRsai for i = 1, 2.• The Pareto frontier of efficient, mutually beneficial, sharing
configurations is non-empty. All configurations on the Pareto
frontier involve at least one agent sharing energy with the
other at the maximum possible rate, i.e., ci = c for at least
one i ∈ {1, 2}.
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b1
b2 Empty Int. Full
Empty
d
dt b1 = [r1 −min(c1, (r2)−)]+ ddt b1 = max(0, r1) ddt b1 = 1{r2≥min(c2,(r1)−)}[r1 +min(c, (r2)+)]+
d
dt b2 = [r2 −min(c2, (r1)−)]+ ddt b2 = r2 −min(c2, (r1)−) ddt b2 = 1{r2<min(c2,(r1)−)}[r2 −min(c2, (r1)−)]
Int.
d
dt b1 = r1 −min(c1, (r2)−) ddt b1 = r1 ddt b1 = r1 +min(c, (r2)+)
d
dt b2 = max(0, r2) ddt b2 = r2 ddt b2 = min(0, r2)
Full
d
dt b1 = 1{r1<min(c1,(r2)−)}[r1 −min(c1, (r2)−)] ddt b1 = min(0, r1) ddt b1 = min(0, r1)
d
dt b2 = 1{r1≥min(c1,(r2)−)}[r2 +min(c, (r1)+)]+ ddt b2 = r2 +min(c, (r1)+) ddt b2 = min(0, r2)
Table 1: Battery dynamics of two agents; the battery level b1 of Agent 1 is along the rows while the battery level b2 of Agent 2
is along the columns. Here Int. stands for intermediate.
The above results are proved using monotonicity properties of the
loss of load rates with respect to c1 and c2. These monotonicity
properties, which are illuminating in their own right, are the focus
of the following section.
3 MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES
Without loss of generality, we assume that
ci ≤ ci,max := min(c, max
s ∈S {[r−i (s)]−}
for i ∈ {1, 2}). Given the sharing mechanism described in Sec-
tion 2.2, it is easy to see that increasing ci beyondmaxs ∈S {[r−i (s)]−}
does not influence the realised energy sharing, since agents only
help fulfill the other’s deficit rates (except under overflow, which is
not constrained by (c1, c2)).
The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Under the proposed sharing mechanism,
• LLRi (c1, c2) is strictly increasing in ci over [0, ci,max],
• LLRi (c1, c2) is strictly decreasing in c−i over [0, c−i,max],
• LLR1(c1, c2) + LLR2(c1, c2) is strictly decreasing in ci over
[0, ci,max].
The first two statements of Theorem 3.1 are intuitive; if the peak
rate ci of energy transfer from Agent i to Agent −i is increased,
the loss of load rate of Agent i increases, while that of Agent −i de-
creases. The third statement shows that an increase in ci decreases
the overall loss of load rate across the two agents. In other words, an
increase in ci is detrimental to Agent i, beneficial to Agent −i, and
beneficial to the overall system LLR. Immediate takeaways from
Theorem 3.1 are the following. First, the ‘socially optimal’ config-
uration is (c1,max, c2,max). Second, interpreting ci to be Agent i’s
action, the only Nash equilibrium of the resulting two-player game
is (0,0). This means that a non-cooperative setting does not yield
efficient sharing configurations. Instead, mutually beneficial shar-
ing configurations can only be sustained via binding agreements
between the agents, in the spirit of bargaining theory.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theo-
rem 3.1. We are able to prove monotonicity properties of the loss
of load rates without any explicit expressions of the same using
sample path techniques. Specifically, we consider two identical in-
stances of our model, one operating under sharing configuration
(c1, c2), where c1 < c1,max and the other operating under sharing
configuration (c1+ϵ, c2),where ϵ > 0 such that c1+ϵ ≤ c1,max.We
refer to the former system as the ‘original system’ and the latter one
as the ‘∼ system’; we denote parameters pertaining to this latter
system with a ∼ accent. To prove Theorem 3.1, it suffices to show
that
LLR1 > LLR1, LLR2 < LLR1, and LLR1 + LLR2 < LLR1 + LLR2.
We prove these inequalities by coupling the sample paths of the
background process across these systems. In other words, both
systems see exactly the same net generation at all times;5 all that
distinguishes these systems is the upper bound on the energy trans-
fer rate from Agent 1 to Agent 2 (c1 in the original system versus
c1 + ϵ in the ∼ system). Our first result compares the battery levels
of the two agents across the two systems.
Lemma 3.2. On any sample path, under the coupling between the
original and∼ system described above, ifb1(0) = b˜1(0), b2(0) = b˜2(0),
then for all t ≥ 0,
b˜1(t) ≤ b1(t), b˜2(t) ≤ b2(t). (3)
Lemma 3.2 states that in the ∼ system, which permits a higher
rate of energy transfer from Agent 1 to Agent 2 relative to the origi-
nal system, the battery occupancies of both agents get reduced. The
intuition behind this result is the following. Since Agent 1 transfers
more energy to Agent 2 in the ∼ system, its battery occupancy gets
reduced relative to the original system. Importantly however, this
increased energy transfer from Agent 1 to Agent 2 is utilized purely
to cut the loss of load suffered by Agent 2, and not to charge its bat-
tery. Over time, this causes a reduction in the battery occupancy of
Agent 2 as well, due to (i) reduced energy transfer from Agent 1 in
the form of battery overflow (which can be used to charge Agent 2’s
battery), and (ii) increased energy transfer to Agent 1 when it faces
loss of load. This intuition is formalized in our proof of Lemma 3.2,
which can be found in the appendix.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3.2 is the following lemma.
Let Oi (t) (respectively, O˜i (t)) denote the cumulative energy lost due
to battery overflow in the interval [0, t] from the battery of Agent i
in the original system (respectively, in the ∼ system). Also, let ℓi (t)
(respectively, ℓ˜i (t)) denote the cumulative lost load by Agent i in
the original system (respectively, in the ∼ system). Specifically, note
5That is, the battery levels b1(t ), b˜1(t ) get modulated by the same net generation
process r1(t ) while battery levels b2(t ), b˜2(t ) get modulated by same net generation
process r2(t ).
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that for i ∈ {1, 2},
LLRi = limt→∞
ℓi (t)
t
, L˜LRi = limt→∞
ℓ˜i (t)
t
.
Lemma 3.3. On any sample path, under the coupling between the
original and∼ system described above, ifb1(0) = b˜1(0), b2(0) = b˜2(0),
then for all t ≥ 0,
ℓ˜1(t) ≥ ℓ1(t), (4)
O˜i (t) ≤ Oi (t) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. (5)
Lemma 3.3 states that the ∼ system ‘wastes’ less energy due to
overflow from either battery, as compared to the original system.
Further, it shows that in the ∼ system, Agent 1 incurs greater loss
of load compared to the original system.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Since b˜1(t) ≤ b1(t) (Lemma 3.2), if Agent 1
faces loss of load in the original system at any time t , then it also
faces loss of load in the ∼ system at that time. Moreover, since
(i) b˜2(t) ≤ b2(t) (also by Lemma 3.2), and (ii) the bound c2 on the
rate of energy transfer from Agent 2 to Agent 1 is the same in
both systems, it follows that the instantaneous rate of lost load in
the ∼ system exceeds that in the original system at all times. This
implies (4). It is important to note that a similar argument does not
hold for Agent 2, since it enjoys a higher rate of energy transfer
from Agent 1 in the ∼ system.
A similar line of reasoning can also be used to prove the in-
equalities for cumulative energy lost due to overflow (5). Since
b˜i (t) ≤ bi (t) (Lemma 3.2) and given that the batteries are driven by
the same net generation process across both systems, an overflow
out of Battery i in the ∼ system at any time implies an overflow at
at least the same rate out of Battery i in the original system. □
We are now ready to give the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. From Lemma 3.3, it follows that
lim
t→∞
ℓ˜1(t)
t
≥ lim
t→∞
ℓ1(t)
t
⇒ L˜LR1 ≥ LLR1.
That the latter inequality is strict follows from a straightforward re-
newal reward argument, which we sketch here. Given our coupling
between the original and ∼ systems, consider a renewal process,
where the renewal instants correspond to hitting times of the con-
figurationX (t) = s2 andbi (t) = 0 for i = 1, 2. Let ℓi (n) (respectively,
ℓ˜i (n)) denote the lost load in the nth renewal cycle by Agent i in the
original (respectively, the ∼) system. Thus, by the renewal reward
theorem,
LLRi =
E [ℓi (1)]
E [T ] , L˜LRi =
E
[
ℓ˜i (1)
]
E [T ] ,
where T denotes the length of a typical renewal cycle. Using the
above characterization, it suffices to show thatE
[
ℓ˜i (1)
]
> E [ℓi (1)] .
Since ℓ˜i (1) ≥ ℓi (1) on all sample paths, one has to simply argue that
with positive probability, ℓ˜i (1) > ℓi (1). This is not hard to show.
Thus, we have
L˜LR1 > LLR1. (6)
It therefore follows more generally that LLRi (c1, c2) is strictly in-
creasing in ci .
Next, recall that under our coupling of the background process
for the original system and the ∼ system, the total energy received
in original system within any time interval [0, t] is equal to the
total energy received in ∼ system within the same time interval.
Thus,
b1(t) + b2(t) + ℓc1 (t) + ℓc2 (t) + O1(t) + O2(t)
= b˜1(t) + b˜2(t) + ℓ˜c1 (t) + ℓ˜c2 (t) + O˜1(t) + O˜2(t), (7)
where ℓci (t) (respectively, ℓ˜ci (t)) is the cumulative load catered (i.e.,
demand supplied) by Agent i over the interval [0 t] in the origi-
nal system (respectively, the ∼ system). Since Oi (t) ≥ O˜i (t) (by
Lemma 3.3),
O1(t) + O2(t) ≥ O˜1(t) + O˜2(t). (8)
Similarly, since bi (t) ≥ b˜i (t) (by Lemma 3.2), we have
b1(t) + b2(t) ≥ b˜1(t) + b˜2(t). (9)
Therefore, using (8) and (9) in (7), we get
ℓc1 (t) + ℓc2 (t) ≤ ℓ˜c1 (t) + ℓ˜c2 (t)
i.e., the total cumulative load served or demand supplied over [0, t]
in the original system is less than or equal to that in the ∼ system.
It follows now that within the interval [0, t], the cumulative lost
load in original system is greater than or equal to that in ∼ system,
i.e., ℓ˜1(t) + ℓ˜2(t) ≤ ℓ1(t) + ℓ2(t), which implies
lim
t→∞
{
ℓ˜1(t)
t
+
ℓ˜2(t)
t
}
≤ lim
t→∞
{
ℓ1(t)
t
+
ℓ2(t)
t
}
⇒ L˜LR1 + L˜LR2 ≤ LLR1 + LLR2.
Again, it can be shown that the above inequality is strict via a
renewal reward argument, so that
L˜LR1 + L˜LR2 < LLR1 + LLR2. (10)
This shows that more generally, LLR1(c1, c2)+LLR1(c1, c2) is strictly
decreasing with respect to any ci .
Finally, it follows from (6) and (10) that L˜LR2 < LLR2, which
establishes that LLRi (c1, c2) is strictly decreasing in c−i . □
Armed with Theorem 3.1, we address the existence of mutually
beneficial sharing configurations, and the structure of the Pareto
frontier of efficient sharing configurations in the following section.
We conclude this section by noting that LLRi (·, ·) is a continuous
function, specifically Lipschitz continuous.
Lemma 3.4. For i ∈ {1, 2}, |LLRi (c1 + ϵ, c2) − LLRi (c1, c2)| ≤ ϵ .
Proof. Using the same notation as before, it is not hard to see
that ℓ˜1(t) ≤ ℓ1(t) + ϵt ; indeed, occasionally transferring energy
at an additional rate of ϵ to Agent 2 results in Agent 1 losing at
most ϵt additional load until time t . This implies LLR1(c1 + ϵ, c2) −
LLR1(c1, c2) ≤ ϵ . A similar argument also applies to LLR2. □
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3.4 is that LLRi (·, ·) is
differentiable almost everywhere.
4 PARETO-OPTIMAL SHARING
In this section, our goal is to shed light on meaningful sharing
configurations that the agents might agree upon from a game theo-
retic standpoint. Our first step is to show that there exist sharing
configurations that are beneficial to both agents.
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4.1 Existence of mutually beneficial
configurations
Recall that ci denotes the maximum rate at which Agent i shares
energy with Agent −i when the latter faces loss of load. Moreover,
ci ≤ ci,max; this constraint incorporates any physical transmission
constraints that limit the flow of energy from one agent to the other.
Thus, the space of possible sharing configurations is given by
X = [0, c1,max] × [0, c2,max].
We also define
Xo = [0, c1,max) × [0, c2,max).
Note that Xo excludes those configurations where either or both
of the parameters ci take their maximum value.
Our first result shows that given any configuration in Xo , it is
possible to perturb it in such a manner that both agents are compar-
atively better off. Specializing this result to the configuration (0, 0),
we conclude that mutually beneficial configurations are guaranteed
to exist.6 Remarkably, this is true no matter how asymmetric the
net generation processes might be across the agents; it is always
possible to find sharing arrangements that enable the agents to help
one another.
Lemma 4.1. For any sharing configuration (c1, c2) ∈ Xo , there ex-
ists a direction (1,θ ), whereθ > 0, such that the gradients∇LLRi (c1, c2)
satisfy ∇LLRi (c1, c2) · (1,θ ) < 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Since the total loss of load rate LLR1(c1, c2)+
LLR2(c1, c2) strictly decreases with ci (see Theorem 3.1), differenti-
ating with respect to c1 and c2, we get
∂LLR1
∂c1
< − ∂LLR2
∂c1
,
∂LLR2
∂c2
< − ∂LLR1
∂c2
.
⇒ ∂LLR1
∂c1
∂LLR2
∂c2
< (− ∂LLR2
∂c1
)(− ∂LLR1
∂c2
) ⇒
∂LLR1
∂c1
− ∂LLR1∂c2
<
− ∂LLR2∂c1
∂LLR2
∂c2
Therefore, there exists a θ > 0 such that
∂LLR1
∂c1
− ∂LLR1∂c2
< θ <
− ∂LLR2∂c1
∂LLR2
∂c2
,
which implies that ∇LLR1 · (1,θ ) < 0 and ∇LLR2 · (1,θ ) < 0. □
Next, we turn to the set of Pareto-optimal sharing configurations.
4.2 Pareto frontier
We begin by defining Pareto-optimal configurations.
Definition 4.2. An energy sharing configuration (c1, c2) ∈ X
is Pareto-optimal if there does not exist (cˆ1, cˆ2) ∈ X such that
LLRi (cˆ1, cˆ2) ≤ LLRi (c1, c2) for all i ∈ {1, 2}, the inequality being
strict for at least one i .
The set of Pareto-optimal sharing configurations is denoted byP,
and is referred to as the Pareto frontier. Pareto-optimal sharing
configurations are efficient, in the sense that there do not exist
configurations that dominate them. In other words, over the Pareto
6Recall that the configuration (0, 0) is itself mutually beneficial as compared to stan-
dalone operation (i.e., without overflow sharing).
frontier, the LLR of any agent can be only improved by increasing
the LLR of the other.
Lemma 4.1 shows that there are no Pareto-optimal configurations
in Xo . The following theorem shows that the Pareto frontier is
in fact X \ Xo . Moreover, the Pareto frontier contains mutually
beneficial configurations.
Theorem 4.3. The Pareto frontier P = X \ Xo . Moreover, there
exists points (c1, c2) ∈ P satisfying LLRi (c1, c2) < LLRsai for all
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Theorem 4.3 shows that all efficient sharing configurations in-
volve at least one agent transferring energy to the other at the
maximum possible rate when the latter faces loss of load. More-
over, there exist efficient configurations that are mutually beneficial
relative to standalone operation. Intuitively, if Agent i is consid-
erably more deficit prone than Agent −i, then efficient, mutually
beneficial would involve ci = ci,max. This way, Agent i transfers
energy to Agent −i at the maximum possible rate at those relatively
rare instances when the latter faces loss of load load. In return,
Agent −i agrees to a modest rate of energy transfer to Agent i at
those (relatively more often) times when it faces deficit.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. That the Pareto frontier consists of all
points inX \Xo follows by noting that these configurations cannot
be dominated by any other configuration in X. To see this, suppose
that (c1, c2) ∈ X \ Xo . From Theorem 3.1, it follows that no other
configuration in X \ Xo dominates (c1, c2). For the purpose of
obtaining a contradiction, suppose that there exists (c ′1, c ′2) ∈ Xo
that dominates (c1, c2). But Lemma 4.1 shows that there exists
(c ′′1 , c ′′2 ) ∈ X \ Xo that further dominates (c ′1, c ′2), and thus also
dominates (c1, c2), yielding a contradiction.
To argue that there exist mutually beneficial configurations in
the Pareto frontier, consider the optimization
max
(c1,c2)∈X
[LLR1(0, 0) − LLR1(c1, c2)]+[LLR2(0, 0) − LLR2(c1, c2)]+.
Since this is the maximization of a continuous function over a
compact set, an optimal solution, say (c∗1 , c∗2), exists. Moreover,
in light of Lemma 4.1, the objective value at (c∗1 , c∗2) is strictly
positive. This means (c∗1 , c∗2) is Pareto-optimal, and also satisfies
LLRi (c1, c2) < LLRi (0, 0) < LLRsai for both i ∈ {1, 2}. □
4.3 Bargaining solutions
Having proved that there exist configurations on the Pareto frontier
that benefit both agents relative to standalone operation, the next
natural question is to capture the configuration that the (strategic)
agents would agree upon. Of course, the set of mutually beneficial
configurations on the Pareto frontier involves a tradeoff between
the payoffs of the two agents, so the agreement would have to
balance the gains of the two agents. This is precisely the question
that the theory of bargaining addresses [20].
Bargaining theory proposes various solution concepts that seek
to capture the agreement that selfish agents would agree upon, in-
cluding the celebratedNash bargaining solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, the egalitarian solution and the utilitarian solution; each
of these solution concepts have an elegant axiomatic justification
[20]. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the egalitarian solution
Pareto-optimal energy sharing between battery-equipped renewable generators Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
(0,1.5) (0.75,1.5) (1.5,1.5) (1.5,0.75) (1.5,0)
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
LL
R
LLR
LLR
LLR
LLR
(a) r1(t ), r2(t ) ∈ {−1.5, 2}
(0,1.5) (0.75,1.5) (1.5,1.5) (1.5,0.75) (1.5,0)
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
LL
R
LLR
LLR
LLR
LLR
(b) r1(t ) ∈ {−1.5, 2} and r2(t ) ∈ {−1.5, 2.15}
(0,1.5) (0.75,1.5) (1.5,1.5) (1.5,0.75) (1.5,0)
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
LL
R
LLR
LLR
LLR
LLR
(c) r1(t ) ∈ {−1.5, 2} and r2(t ) ∈ {−1.5, 2.5}
Figure 1: Toy example all case: LLR variation with sharing configuration (c1, c2) ∈ X \ Xo when the net generation processes
of two agents are symmetric(left) and asymmetric (middle, right). B1 = B2 = 10
in this paper, which tries to balance the benefits of the agents as
far as possible.
Formally, the egalitarian solution (ceд1 , c
eд
2 ) is defined by
(ceд1 , c
eд
2 ) = argmax(c1,c2)∈P
min
i ∈{1,2}
{[LLRsai − LLRi (c1, c2)]+}.
The egalitarian solution is fair, in that it maximizes the minimum
benefit (measured by the reduction in LLR relative to standalone
operation) of the agents. If feasible, the egalitarian solution would
in fact equalize these benefits. In the following section, we illustrate
the benefits that can be achieved in practice with our proposed
sharing mechanism under the egalitarian solution.
5 CASE STUDY
To validate our theoretical findings, in this section, we present a
simulation study using a toy model comprising two independent
Markov net generation processes, and a case study involving a solar
generator and a wind generator using real-world data traces.
5.1 Toy example
We consider the net generation processes of the two agents as
independent, two-state CTMCs. Specifically, the rate matrix cor-
responding to each agent is taken as Q =
[−1 1
1 −1
]
. This means
that for each agent, state transitions occur after exponentially dis-
tributed intervals of unit mean length. We consider three cases for
the net generation values:
• Symmetric case: r1(t), r2(t) ∈ {−1.5, 2}
• Asymmetric case 1: r1(t) ∈ {−1.5, 2} and r2(t) ∈ {−1.5, 2.15}
• Asymmetric case 2: r1(t) ∈ {−1.5, 2} and r2(t) ∈ {−1.5, 2.5}
Top to bottom, note that Agent 2 becomes increasingly ‘genera-
tive’ relative to Agent 1 in the above scenarios. The battery sizes
are set as B1 = B2 = 10. For each sharing configuration (c1, c2),
the CTMCs {r1(t)} and {r2(t)} are simulated for a suitably long
duration and the temporal evolution of battery and the incurred
loss of load for each agent is captured. The loss of load rate (LLRi )
for Agent i is computed as the cumulative loss of load over the
simulation horizon, divided by the horizon length. Figure 1 depicts
the variation of the LLR of each agent over the Pareto frontier for all
three settings. For convenience of presentation, we have ‘flattened’
the Pareto frontier to be the horizontal axis in these figures; i.e.,
the independent variable ranges from (0, c2max) to (c1max, 0) via
(c1max, c2max), covering entire range of the Pareto frontier X \Xo .
The constraint parameter c is set as 1.5 (and hence it only restricts
the overflow), so that c1,max = c2,max = 1.5.
The monotonicity properties of LLR (Theorem 3.1) are evident
from Figure 1. For the symmetric case (panel (a)), each agent experi-
ences the same standalone LLRsai and the same value of LLRi (0, 0).
For the asymmetric cases, the standalone loss of load rates of the
two agents LLRsa are different (see panels (b) and (c)). As expected,
the egalitarian bargaining solution for the symmetric case is found
to be full sharing, i.e., (1.5, 1.5), resulting in an 85% reduction in
LLR for each agent relative to the standalone setting. In asymmetric
case 1, where Agent 2 becomes more generative, the bargaining
solution shifts ‘right’ to (1.5, 0.75), i.e., Agent 2 reduces its peak en-
ergy transfer rate to Agent 1. In asymmetric case 2, where Agent 2
becomes even more generative, the egalitarian solution shifts fur-
ther ‘right’ to (1.5, 0), i.e., Agent 1 shares energy with Agent 2 at
the maximum rate when the latter faces loss of load, but Agent 2
only shares its overflow energy with Agent 1. Intuitively, this is
because Agent 2 is substantially less likely to face loss of load in this
example, and substantially more likely to have an energy overflow.
Thus, Agent 1 obtains a considerable benefit from just receiving
this overflow energy, which it reciprocates by sharing energy with
Agent 1 at the maximum rate when the latter faces a deficit.
5.2 Energy sharing between wind and solar
generator
We collected six years of wind generation data corresponding to a
location in New Mexico, USA. The data is obtained from the Wind
Integration National Dataset (WIND) Toolkit, which has been made
public by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) [14]. The
data obtained is of five-minute temporal resolution and ranges from
0-16 megawatt of wind power. For the same location, we obtained
the hourly solar generation data trace from the software tool SAM,
also available on the NREL website. Assuming the solar power to be
constant over each hour, this hourly data trace of solar generation,
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Figure 2: Simulation results with wind and solar data traces.
LLR1 and LLR2 are plotted for various sharing configura-
tions covering the entire Pareto-frontier. B1 = B2 = 500kWh
which ranges from 0-16 megawatt of power, is converted into a
time series with a finer temporal resolution of five minutes.
We consider Agent 1 to be a wind generator, and Agent 2 to
be a solar generator, with the above generation traces. To capture
demand, for Agent 1, we fix a constant demand that is 90% of
the time average wind generation. Since solar generation is only
available from around 7 am to 5 pm (total 10 hours), we chose a
demand curve which is non-zero only during this interval i.e., 7
am to 5 pm. The demand value during this interval is chosen to be
90 percent of the average solar generation, where the averaging
is only performed over the same interval. Each agent is equipped
with a battery capacity 500 kWh.
Over the six years of time series data, the standalone LLRsa
of Agent 1 (the wind generator) is computed to be 1.8873 MW,
whereas that of Agent 2 (the solar generator) equals 0.7218MW. The
considerably higher standalone LLR for thewind generator suggests
that the wind generation is much more ‘variable’ than the solar
generation. The loss of load rate of both agents over the (flattened,
as before) Pareto frontier is plotted in Figure 2. Note that there
is a substantial reduction in LLR (relative to standalone setting)
for the wind generator, but only a modest reduction for the solar
generator (again, consistent with the considerably higher variability
of wind generation). Thus, the egalitarian solution corresponds to
(ceд1 , c
eд
2 ) = (c1max, 0), i.e., the wind generator shares energy with
the solar generator at the peak rate when the latter faces a deficit,
whereas the solar generator only shares its overflow with the wind
generator. The associated reduction in loss of load rate (compared
to the standalone setting) is 70% for the wind generator and 22%
for the solar generator.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work motivates extensions along various directions. A natural
first step would be to generalize the sharing mechanism to multiple
(more than two) agents, and characterize the Pareto frontier of the
achievable reliability vectors. Another useful direction is to consider
other reliability metrics, potentially capturing (i) shorter timescales,
and (ii) a non-linear cost/penalty associated with increasing loss of
load.
Another interesting line of questions pertains to network for-
mation: Given a collection of renewable generators, which of them
should come together to enter into an energy sharing agreement?
Since statistical diversity lies at the core of effective energy sharing,
it is also important to consider policy interventions that would
encourage energy sharing agreements between geographically sep-
arated renewable generators. Indeed, such generators would have
to be allowed to fulfill a deficit in generation at one bus on the
grid with a surplus injection at another (of course subject to grid
stability considerations).
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7 APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let {tk }k ∈Z+ denote the transition instances
when the background process {X (t)} changes its state, so that the
net generation values r1(t) and/or r2(t), change at these instances.
Therefore, within any time slot (tk , tk+1], the net generation is
constant for both agents.
The proof proceeds via induction. We assume Lemma 3.2 holds
at time tk . We will verify that in each of the possible ways in which
the dynamics of the original system and the ∼ system can evolve,
Lemma 3.2 holds ∀t ∈ (tk , tk+1]. We define instances ei , e˜i , fi , f˜i ∈(
tk , tk+1
]
as the instants when bi (ei ) = 0, b˜i (e˜i ) = 0, bi (fi ) = Bi
and b˜i ( f˜i ) = Bi , respectively. Occasionally, for simplicity, we refer
to the battery (not battery level) of Agent i in the original system
(respectively, in the ∼ system) by bi (respectively, by b˜i ). Let ri
denote the net generation rate of Agent i within the slot (tk , tk+1].
There are the following four cases to consider.
Case 1: r1 > 0, r2 > 0
There is no energy sharing in this case, so it is easy to see that the
ordering of battery occupancies between the two systems continues
to hold for t ∈ (tk , tk+1].
Case 2: r1 < 0, r2 > 0
Throughout the interval (tk tk+1], there is no energy transfer from
Agent 1 to Agent 2 in this case, in the original system as well as in
the ∼ system. Therefore the extra ϵ in the sharing configuration of
Agent 1 in the ∼ system is inconsequential and the induction step
follows as before.
Case 3: r1 < 0, r2 < 0
Due to space constraints, we only consider the case where b˜1 gets
fully discharged before b˜2, i.e., tk < e˜1 < e˜2. The complementary
case can be handled on similar lines. The two possible cases are:
(1) b1 discharges before b˜2 which leads to the only possible
sequence of events as e˜1 < e1 < e˜2 < e2 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: r1 < 0, r2 < 0, b1 discharges before b˜2
It is clear from Figure 3 that the induction argument in
Lemma 3.2 holds ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+1].
(2) b˜2 discharges before b1 which leads to the possible sequence
of events as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: r1 < 0, r2 < 0, b˜2 discharges before b1
Again, it is clear from Figure 4 that Lemma 3.2 holds ∀ t ∈
[tk , tk+1].
Case 4: r1 > 0, r2 < 0
In this, there are two major cases to be considered, each one needs
a separate analysis for r1 ≥ |r2 | and for r1 < |r2 |.
Subcase 1: b1 becomes full before b˜2 drains to zero (tk < f1 < e˜2).
1a: r1 ≥ |r2 |
Figure 5: r2 < 0 < r1, r1 ≥ |r2 |
From time f1 onwards, b1 gives energy to b2 with rate r1 due
to its overflow. Since the overflow is greater than or equal to the
absolute value of the discharging rate of b2, b2 will either charge or
remain at the same level whereas b˜1 will continue to charge and
won’t discharge even after b˜2 discharges to zero. Once b˜1 is full,
rate of change of battery levels in b2 and b˜2 is the same (if b2 is
not fully charged). Therefore from f1 onwards, either b2 = B2 or
Ûb2 = Û˜b2 which results in b2 ≥ b˜2 ∀t ∈ [f1, tk+1]. Also note that
from f1 onwards, b1 = B1. Therefore together we conclude that
lemma 3.2 holds for ∀t ∈ [tk , tk+1].
1b: r1 < |r2 |
In this there are three further cases to consider:
1b-A:When full, bothb1 and b˜1 allows discharge i.e., r1 < min(c1,−r2)
and hence r1 < min(c1 + ϵ,−r2). Possible event sequences are:
(1) f1 < e˜2 < e˜1 < e2 < e1
(2) f1 < e˜2 < e2 < e˜1 < e1
(3) f1 < f˜1 < e˜2 < e2 < e˜1 < e1
(4) f1 < f˜1 < e˜2 < e˜1 < e2 < e1
It is not hard to verify that, in each case, the battery induction
argument (3) holds along the sequence of events. Sequence (4) is
depicted in the figure below. Other sequences can easily be verified
analogously.
Figure 6: r2 < 0 < r1, r1 < |r2 |; when full, both b1 and b˜1 al-
lows discharge
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1b-B: When full, neither b1 nor b˜1 allows the discharge i.e. r1 ≥
min(c1,−r2) and r1 ≥ min(c1 + ϵ,−r2). Due to r1 < |r2 |, possible
event sequences are:
(1) f1 < e˜2 < f˜1 < e2
(2) f1 < e˜2 < e2 < f˜1
(3) f1 < f˜1 < e˜2 < e2
Sequence (3) is depicted in the figure below. Other sequences can
be verified similarly.
Figure 7: r2 < 0 < r1, r1 < |r2 |; when full, neither b1 nor b˜1
allows discharge
1b-C:When full,b1 does not allow the discharge but b˜1 does i.e. r1 ≥
min(c1,−r2) and r1 < min(c1 + ϵ,−r2). Possible event sequences
are:
(1) f1 < e˜2 < e˜1 < e2
(2) f1 < e˜2 < e2 < e˜1
In these cases, note that from f1 onwards, b1 shares with b2 with
rate r1(> 0) due to overflow. Since r1 < |r2 |, it is easy to see that
either both batteries, b2 and b˜2, discharges (b2 discharges slowly
due to the overflow it receives) or eventually at one point b˜2 hits the
zeros level and remains zero after that. This ensures that b2(t) ≥
b˜2(t) ∀t ∈ [f1, tk+1]. The fact that b1 remains full from f1 onwards,
ensures that b1(t) ≥ b˜1(t) ∀t ∈ [f1, tk+1]. This is depicted below.
Figure 8: r2 < 0 < r1, r1 < |r2 |; when full, b1 doesn’t allow
discharge but b˜1 does
Subcase 2: b˜2 drains to zero before b1 becomes full (tk < e˜2 < f1)
2a: r1 ≥ |r2 |
From e˜2 onwards, b˜1 shares energy to b˜2 with rate constrained
to min{c1 + ϵ, (r2)−}. The fact that r1 ≥ |r2 | implies that b˜1 will
continues to charge even after sharing.
Figure 9: r2 < 0 < r1, r1 ≥ |r2 |
2b: r1 < |r2 |
Since r1 < |r2 |, b˜2 remains empty from e˜2 onwards, and hence
b˜(t) ≤ b2(t) ∀t ∈ [e˜2, tk+1] which proves Lemma 3.2 for Agent 2
side which comprises b2 and b˜2 (see Figure 10).
Figure 10: r2 < 0 < r1, r1 < |r2 |
On Agent 1 side, b˜1 shares to b˜2 with a maximum sharing rate
min(c1 + ϵ, (r2)−). Here, as before, there are three cases to consider.
2b-A:When full, bothb1 and b˜1 allows discharge i.e. r1 < min(c1,−r2)
and hence r1 < min(c1 + ϵ,−r2). Possible event sequences are:
(1) e˜2 < f1 < e2 < e˜1 < e1
(2) e˜2 < f1 < e˜1 < e2 < e1
(3) e˜2 < e2 < e˜1 < e1
(4) e˜2 < e˜1 < e2 < e1
2b-B: When full, neither b1 nor b˜1 allows the discharge i.e. r1 ≥
min(c1,−r2) and r1 ≥ min(c1 + ϵ,−r2). Possible event sequences
are:
(1) e˜2 < f1 < e2 < f˜1
(2) e˜2 < f1 < f˜1 < e2
(3) e˜2 < e2 < f1 < f˜1
2b-C:When full, b1 don’t allow the discharge but b˜1 does i.e. r1 ≥
min(c1,−r2) and r1 < min(c1 + ϵ,−r2). Possible event sequences
are:
(1) e˜2 < f1 < e˜1 < e2
(2) e˜2 < f1 < e2 < e˜1
(3) e˜2 < e˜1 < f1 < e2
(4) e˜2 < e˜1 < e2 < f1
(5) e˜2 < e2 < f1 < e˜1
(6) e˜2 < e2 < e˜1 < f1
With careful observation along each of these sequences, it can
be easily verified that b˜1(t) ≤ b1(t), b˜2(t) ≤ b2(t) ∀t ∈ [e˜2 tk+1].
□
